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Over the past twenty years, major structural changes,
including rapid consolidation among institutions,
have altered the shape of the banking industry. Struc-
tural change has been driven by advances in tech-
nology, efforts to increase efﬁciency and reduce costs,
the general performance of the economy, and the
globalization of ﬁnancial services markets. Deregula-
tion of various aspects of banking, including a relax-
ation of regulatory restrictions on the ability of bank-
ing organizations to purchase other institutions and to
establish branch ofﬁces, has also contributed signiﬁ-
cantly to the changes in banking structure.
Consolidation in the industry has resulted from
mergers of previously independent institutions, the
failure of a large number of commercial banks and
savings associations (savings banks and savings and
loan associations), and consolidation within bank
holding companies. Industry analysts have advanced
certain explanations for the drive to consolidate. In
one view, consolidation is primarily a response to an
oversupply of banking institutions and ofﬁces, or
‘‘overcapacity.’’ Overcapacity has resulted from
advances in technology, the easing of some regula-
tory restrictions, and inroads by nonbank ﬁnancial
institutions into traditional banking service markets.
Another view is that some consolidation is motivated
by strategic considerations and may, in some cases,
have anticompetitive effects.
These structural changes may have inﬂuenced the
distribution of banking ofﬁces, that is, their number
and location.1 This article explores the relationship
between these changes and the distribution of ofﬁces
between 1975 and 1995, particularly across neighbor-
hoods grouped by the median income of residents
and location (central city, suburban, or rural). The
examination is restricted to ‘‘brick and mortar’’
ofﬁces, which traditionally have been the most impor-
tant delivery system that banking institutions use to
provide products and services to households and busi-
ness customers.2 In these ofﬁces, customers can con-
duct a host of deposit, borrowing, and other ﬁnancial
transactions through tellers, loan ofﬁcers, and other
customer service representatives.
Although much discussion about the possible
effects of structural changes in banking on branching
activity has taken place, only limited information has
been available for a systematic analysis of this issue.
This analysis relies on a new, specially constructed
database that combines information on banking ofﬁce
locations, mergers and consolidations, failures of
commercial banks and savings associations, and
neighborhood economic and demographic character-
istics. The Federal Reserve’s National Information
Center database, supplemented with data supplied by
the Ofﬁce of Thrift Supervision, was used to track
mergers, acquisitions, and failures over time. Infor-
mation from the Census of Population and Housing
for 1970, 1980, and 1990 and Bureau of the Census
estimates for the intervening years were used to
assign economic and demographic characteristics to
the geographic area containing each banking ofﬁce.
Appendix A provides details on the construction of
the database used in this article.
These structural and distributional changes have
raised some public concerns. One concern is that
consolidation will tend to reduce the number of bank-
ing ofﬁces and possibly the availability of services.
Another is that banks and savings associations may
be closing ofﬁces and reorienting their ofﬁce net-
works to the beneﬁt of more afﬂuent customers at the
expense of lower-income communities. Legislators
and regulators have addressed these varied concerns
through laws and regulations intended to help ensure
that all segments of the public have access to banking
services. The analysis in this article focuses on the
structural and distributional changes in the banking
industry in light of these concerns.
1. In this article the terms ‘‘bank,’’ ‘‘banking institution,’’ and
‘‘banking ofﬁce’’ pertain to commercial banks and savings
associations.
2. Other delivery systems include telephone banking networks,
automated teller machines (ATMs), and software products for home-
based personal computers.GENERAL TRENDS IN DISTRIBUTION
According to the data, the number of banking institu-
tions declined between 1975 and 1995. The number
of banking institutions fell from about 18,600 to
12,200, a decline of 35 percent (table 1). The percent-
age decline was much larger for savings associations
than for commercial banks—52 percent for savings
associations compared with 30 percent for commer-
cial banks—largely because of a relatively high rate
of failure among savings associations in the late
1980s and early 1990s. Because commercial banks
far outnumber savings associations, however, abso-
lute declines were greater for commercial banks.
In contrast, during the same period the number of
banking ofﬁces increased markedly. The total number
of banking ofﬁces rose 29 percent—much of which
was due to a 38 percent increase in the number of
commercial bank ofﬁces. The number of savings
association ofﬁces in 1995 was only 5 percent higher
than the number in 1975.
Not only the number of banking institutions and
ofﬁces but also the size distribution of institutions
and ofﬁce networks has changed substantially. From
1975 to 1995, the proportion of institutions operating
a single ofﬁce declined from 58 percent of all institu-
tions to 40 percent, and the proportion of all ofﬁces
they accounted for declined from 18 percent to
6 percent. Over the same period, the proportion of all
banking institutions operating large ofﬁce networks
(more than ﬁfty ofﬁces) increased from 0.5 percent of
all institutions to roughly 2 percent, while the propor-
tion of ofﬁces they operated increased from 17 per-
cent to 41 percent. As expected, a close association
exists between the asset size of an institution and
the number of ofﬁces it operates. From 1975 to 1995,
large banking institutions (those with assets of more
than $1 billion in constant 1995 dollars) increased as
a percentage of all banking institutions from less than
3 percent to about 5 percent, and the proportion
of all banking ofﬁces operated by these institutions
increased from 31 percent to 51 percent (table 2).
On net, the average number of ofﬁces per insti-
tution increased over this period from three to six
(table 1, memo item). This ﬁnding understates some-
what the degree to which branching expanded among
institutions with multiple ofﬁces (that is, excluding
single-ofﬁce institutions), for which the average num-
ber of ofﬁces per institution increased from six to ten.
Even though in 1995 commercial banks outnumbered
savings associations nearly ﬁve to one (table 1),
savings associations had a disproportionate number
of ofﬁces, in part because single-ofﬁce institutions
have been more common among commercial banks.
Forty-two percent of commercial banks and 28 per-
cent of savings associations operated only one ofﬁce
in 1995 (data not shown in table).
The overall institutional and branching develop-
ments over 1975–95 are the net result of two diver-
gent trends. First, from 1975 to 1985 the total number
of institutions fell slightly, and the number of bank-
ing ofﬁces increased dramatically. The number of
1. Distribution of commercial banks, savings associations, and banking ofﬁces, by number of banking ofﬁces, 1975–95
Percent except as noted
Item
All institutions All banking ofﬁces
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Distribution of institutions and ofﬁces
by number of ofﬁces operated
1 ........................................ 57.5 48.2 46.8 47.3 39.8 18.2 12.1 10.3 9.2 6.4
2–3 ...................................... 25.5 29.3 30.0 26.6 30.7 18.7 17.3 15.4 12.2 11.7
4–10 ..................................... 12.8 16.6 16.5 18.6 21.4 22.9 23.8 20.8 20.6 19.5
11–50 ................................... 3.6 5.2 5.7 6.1 6.5 22.8 25.7 26.5 24.9 21.5
51 or more ............................... .5 .7 1.1 1.4 1.7 17.4 21.1 26.9 33.0 40.9
Total .................................... 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Number of institutions and ofﬁces
by type of institution
Commercial banks ....................... 14,318 14,379 14,377 12,370 10,089 43,482 51,509 56,020 56,129 59,895
Savings associations ...................... 4,300 4,352 3,492 3,167 2,080 15,429 22,962 25,141 23,897 16,161
Total .................................... 18,618 18,731 17,869 15,537 12,169 58,911 74,471 81,161 80,026 76,056
Memo:
Average number of ofﬁces
All institutions ........................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 4.0 4.5 5.2 6.2
Excluding single-ofﬁce institutions ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.0 6.7 7.7 8.9 9.7
Source. Federal Reserve Board, National Information Center database; Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation, Summary of Deposits; and Ofﬁce of Thrift
Supervision, Branch Ofﬁce Survey System.
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and 29 percent for commercial banks. Second, in
contrast, from 1985 to 1995, a marked contraction
occurred in the industry: The number of institutions
declined nearly 32 percent, and the number of ofﬁces
declined about 6 percent. Although commercial banks
and savings associations both recorded substantial
declines in their numbers, their trends regarding the
number of ofﬁces diverged. The number of savings
association ofﬁces dropped precipitously—nearly to
1975 levels; in contrast, the number of commercial
bank ofﬁces continued to increase, although at a
much slower rate than that of the previous ten years.
Most banking ofﬁces—about 73 percent in 1995—
were located in metropolitan areas, either in central
cities or suburbs (table 3). While the overall percent-
age of ofﬁces in metropolitan areas remained fairly
constant over 1975–95, suburban areas gained share
and central cities lost share.
FACTORS INFLUENCING THE DISTRIBUTION
OF BANKING OFFICES
The factors that inﬂuence banks’ decisions to expand
or contract the number of ofﬁces they operate and
where to locate these ofﬁces include ofﬁce proﬁtabil-
2. Distribution of banking institutions and banking ofﬁces,
by type of institution and asset size, 1975–95
Percent
Type of institution
and size
(assets in
millions of dollars)1
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Institution distribution
Commercial banks
Less than 100 ....... 60.4 60.3 59.9 57.3 57.0
100to999 .......... 14.9 14.9 18.5 19.7 22.6
1,000 to 9,999 ...... 1.5 1.4 1.8 2.2 2.7
10,000 or more ...... .1 .2 .2 .4 .6
Savings associations
Less than 100 ....... 11.9 11.1 8.0 8.6 7.8
100to999 .......... 9.9 10.7 9.6 9.8 8.0
1,000 to 9,999 ...... 1.2 1.4 1.9 1.9 1.2
10,000 or more ...... .0 .0 .1 .1 .1
Total ............... 100 100 100 100 100
All institutions
Less than 100 ....... 72.3 71.4 67.9 65.9 64.8
100to999 .......... 24.9 25.6 28.1 29.5 30.7
1,000 to 9,999 ...... 2.7 2.8 3.7 4.1 3.9
10,000 or more ...... .2 .2 .3 .5 .7
Total ............... 100 100 100 100 100
Ofﬁce distribution
Commercial banks
Less than 100 ....... 27.3 24.4 21.0 17.5 16.0
100to999 .......... 22.2 21.8 21.2 19.8 22.0
1,000 to 9,999 ...... 17.0 15.6 18.4 19.8 21.2
10,000 or more ...... 7.3 7.4 8.3 13.0 19.5
Savings associations
Less than 100 ....... 5.6 4.8 3.0 2.9 2.2
100to999 .......... 13.8 16.2 13.2 12.0 8.3
1,000 to 9,999 ...... 6.3 9.2 12.0 11.5 7.5
10,000 or more ...... .5 .7 2.9 3.5 3.2
Total ............... 100 100 100 100 100
All institutions
Less than 100 ....... 32.9 29.1 24.0 20.4 18.3
100to999 .......... 36.0 38.0 34.4 31.8 30.3
1,000 to 9,999 ...... 23.3 24.8 30.4 31.3 28.7
10,000 or more ...... 7.8 8.1 11.2 16.5 22.7
Total ............... 100 100 100 100 100
1. Measured in constant 1995 dollars.
Source. Federal Reserve Board, National Information Center database; Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation, Summary of Deposits; and Ofﬁce of Thrift
Supervision, Branch Ofﬁce Survey System.
3. Distribution of banking ofﬁces and population by
population growth rate and degree of urbanization,
1975–95
Percent
Population growth rate
and degree
of urbanization
of ZIP code area
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Population growth
rate—all areas1
Ofﬁce distribution
Low ............... 45.9 44.4 42.1 41.5 41.9
Moderate .......... 32.8 32.2 31.8 32.3 32.7
High ............... 21.3 23.4 26.1 26.2 25.4
Total ................ 100 100 100 100 100
Urbanization
Population distribution
Central city ........ 42.9 42.0 41.8 41.5 40.9
Suburban .......... 36.6 37.3 38.0 39.1 39.7
Rural .............. 20.5 20.7 20.2 19.4 19.4
Total ................ 100 100 100 100 100
Ofﬁce distribution
Central city ........ 35.6 36.0 35.6 34.8 33.6
Suburban .......... 35.8 36.5 37.2 39.1 39.0
Rural .............. 28.6 27.4 27.2 26.1 27.4
Total ................ 100 100 100 100 100
Urbanization and
population growth rate
Ofﬁce distribution
Central city
Low ............. 13.4 12.9 11.6 11.2 10.8
Moderate ........ 11.0 10.9 10.4 10.4 10.3
High ............ 11.2 12.3 13.6 13.2 12.5
Suburban
Low ............. 17.5 17.4 16.6 17.3 17.4
Moderate ........ 10.5 10.4 10.6 11.2 11.2
High ............ 7.9 8.8 10.0 10.6 10.4
Rural
Low ............. 14.9 14.2 13.9 13.0 13.7
Moderate ........ 11.4 10.9 10.8 10.7 11.2
High ............ 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.3 2.5
Total ................ 100 100 100 100 100
Memo:
Number of ofﬁces .... 58,911 74,471 81,161 80,026 76,056
1. Growth rates for ZIP code areas are deﬁned as follows: ‘‘Low’’ popula-
tion growth is less than or equal to 11 percent in 1975–95 (lowest one-third);
‘‘moderate’’ growth is 12 to 32 percent (middle one-third); ‘‘high’’ growth is
33 percent or more (top one-third).
Source. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Summary of Deposits;
Ofﬁce of Thrift Supervision, Branch Ofﬁce Survey System; and Census of
Population and Housing, 1970, 1980, and 1990.
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general economic and demographic trends, including
population shifts and changing business patterns;
technological developments; the regulatory environ-
ment; and mergers, acquisitions, and failures.
Ofﬁce Proﬁtability
The proﬁtability of an ofﬁce is a function of both the
revenues the ofﬁce generates and its operating costs.
Revenues depend, in part, on the number and charac-
teristics of customers that the ofﬁce attracts or helps
retain and the amount and type of deposits and loans
that it generates. For many institutions, a basic func-
tion of ofﬁces is to attract relatively low-cost check-
ing and savings account deposits that may be used to
fund lending activity. The types and ﬁnancial proﬁles
of residents and businesses in the local commu-
nity, along with the ofﬁce’s product mix and associ-
ated prices, will help determine its effectiveness in
attracting and retaining depositors and other loan
customers.
An important factor inﬂuencing decisions about
ofﬁce locations is demand from current or potential
customers for convenient access to banking services.
Thus, ofﬁce proﬁtability depends in part on such
factors as trafﬁc ﬂow patterns and transportation
routes in an area, the extent of nearby commercial
and retail development, resident and employee pop-
ulation densities, and household preferences for
ofﬁces as opposed to alternative delivery channels.
Evidence from recent surveys sponsored by the Fed-
eral Reserve conﬁrms that the locational convenience
of banking ofﬁces is important both to households
and to small business customers, for most customers
prefer to conduct their banking activities close to
their homes, places of work, or businesses.3 This
evidence suggests that an analysis of changes in the
number and location of banking ofﬁces is most appro-
priately conducted at the neighborhood level, as this
analysis is.
In deciding where to locate its ofﬁces, a banking
institution seeks to meet the needs of existing and
potential customers in a cost-efﬁcient manner. Bank-
ing cost studies have found economies of scale at the
ofﬁce level; that is, average total costs decline until
ofﬁce size (typically measured by total deposits)
reaches some threshold at which the ofﬁce is oper-
ating at its most efﬁcient level. In other words, a
minimum amount of business must be conducted
at an ofﬁce if it is to operate most efﬁciently. At
an ofﬁce where transactions are conducted relatively
infrequently, the average cost of the services pro-
vided will be relatively high. Therefore, unless some
individual customers who use the ofﬁce also generate
substantial revenues or low-cost checking and sav-
ings account deposits for the bank or there are long-
run strategic considerations of the kind discussed
below, the ofﬁce will not be cost-effective to operate.
Studies also ﬁnd that banks that have been con-
strained by legal restrictions on branching can some-
times lower their overall average costs by opening
new ofﬁces when the restrictions are eased. Thus, in
certain circumstances branching may permit a bank
to provide services in more optimally sized ofﬁces.4
Even if an ofﬁce operates at its most efﬁcient level,
an alternative means for delivering banking services,
such as an automated teller machine (ATM), may be
more cost-effective. In such cases, that ofﬁce will be
viewed as less proﬁtable. Over time, such ofﬁces will
be either replaced by the more proﬁtable alternative
or closed, with their customers’ accounts transferred
to other nearby ofﬁces.
Risk Diversiﬁcation and Strategic
Considerations
The potential beneﬁts of risk diversiﬁcation may
provide an incentive for banks to open new ofﬁces
or acquire existing ofﬁces from other institutions. By
operating a geographically dispersed network of
ofﬁces, an institution may achieve greater diversiﬁca-
tion of its deposit base and loan portfolio and thereby
reduce the risk of substantial deposit outﬂows and
loan losses.5
Further, a bank may evaluate whether to open a
new ofﬁce (or close an existing one) within a strate-
gic context; that is, competitive considerations may
carry some weight in an assessment of the costs and
beneﬁts associated with a particular ofﬁce. For exam-
ple, in a fast-growing market, a bank might open
more ofﬁces than it expects to be proﬁtable in the
short run to gain a competitive advantage in the long
run.
3. Myron L. Kwast, Martha Starr-McCluer, and John D. Wolken,
‘‘Market Deﬁnition and the Analysis of Antitrust in Banking,’’ Anti-
trust Bulletin (forthcoming).
4. David B. Humphrey, ‘‘Why Do Estimates of Bank Scale Econo-
mies Differ?’’ Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Economic Review
(September/October 1991), pp. 38–50.
5. See, for example, J. Nellie Liang and Stephen A. Rhoades,
‘‘Geographic Diversiﬁcation and Risk in Banking,’’ Journal of Eco-
nomics and Business, vol. 40 (1988), pp. 271–84.
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Changes in population, income, and business activity
can inﬂuence branching patterns. The establishment
of new households and the movement of many exist-
ing households, for example, have resulted in the
growth of numerous suburban and rural areas as well
as population declines in some urban communities.
Banking institutions may respond to these population
changes by establishing new banking ofﬁces in areas
experiencing growth or by closing and consolidating
ofﬁces in areas of declining population.6
Technological Developments
Technological developments in the delivery of bank-
ing services may affect the number and location
of bank ofﬁces in two ways. First, many consumers
may ﬁnd alternative delivery mechanisms more con-
venient and less costly for many transactions, thus
reducing demand for certain ofﬁce services. Second,
technological developments, particularly the intro-
duction and spread of ATMs, can affect the cost of
operating an ofﬁce, both absolutely and relative to
alternative delivery mechanisms.7 For example, the
average transaction conducted with a bank teller is
estimated to cost more than three times that of a
transaction at an ATM.8 Because they deliver more
convenient and less costly services, ATMs prolifer-
ated from only a few thousand in 1975 to 123,000 in
1995.9 Most ATMs are in bank ofﬁces, where they
substitute for more costly tellers and reduce the cost
of operation. However, large numbers of ATMs
(38,000, or 31 percent, in 1995) are off site, where
they serve as substitutes for bank ofﬁces. Technologi-
cal innovations continue to improve the delivery of
banking services, with potential implications for
future branching patterns.
Deregulation
Over the past two decades, the regulatory environ-
ment in banking has changed dramatically in the
direction of deregulation. Three major aspects of
deregulation between 1975 and 1995 are particularly
pertinent for the analysis of bank branching behavior.
First, the removal of federal limits on the interest
rates that banks could pay depositors changed the
focus of competition among banking organizations
from the quality and extent of services to their price.
Second, most states repealed or liberalized their laws
restricting intrastate branching by commercial banks
and savings associations. Third, banking organiza-
tions were largely freed from restrictions on interstate
expansion by holding company acquisition or merger.
The changes in the laws governing geographic expan-
sion by banking organizations provided institutions
with new opportunities to restructure and expand
their banking ofﬁce networks.
Deregulation of Interest Rates
Before the mid-1980s, commercial banks and savings
associations were subject to federal regulatory restric-
tions on the payment of interest on checking and
savings accounts. The inability of commercial banks
and savings associations to pay market interest rates
had several consequences for their branching activity.
One was that competition for depositors’ funds took
the form of ‘‘quality’’ or ‘‘nonprice’’ rivalry—for
example, offering additional ofﬁces. Another conse-
quence was a periodic outﬂow of funds from banking
institutions because depositors transferred funds to
savings instruments that paid market rates. This out-
ﬂow was particularly large in the late 1970s and early
1980s, when the gap between market interest rates
and regulated deposit rates was widest. This large
gap and the accompanying outﬂow increased the
incentives for institutions to use banking ofﬁces to
acquire checking and savings account deposits,
which, when compared with alternative sources of
funds, were relatively inexpensive.
The Congress acted in the early 1980s to remove
interest rate ceilings on deposit accounts, and by
1986, banking institutions were almost entirely free
of such restrictions.10 With deregulation of deposit
6. An alternative potential response to increased demand for ser-
vices is the establishment of a new, or de novo, bank. For an
assessment of factors inﬂuencing de novo bank entry, see Dean F.
Amel, ‘‘An Empirical Investigation of Potential Competition: Evi-
dence from the Banking Industry,’’ in Benton E. Gup, ed., Bank
Mergers: Current Issues and Perspectives (Kluwer Academic Publish-
ers, 1989), pp. 29–68.
7. See David B. Humphrey, ‘‘Delivering Deposit Services: Banks
Versus Branches,’’ Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Economic
Quarterly, vol. 80 (Spring 1994), pp. 59–81.
8. See Drew Clark, ‘‘Branches’ Persistence Rests with the Public,’’
American Banker (December 4, 1996), p. 10a.
9. See ‘‘EFT Network Data Book,’’ Bank Network News, vol. 15
(November 11, 1996), pp. 1–3.
10. The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Con-
trol Act of 1980 authorized banks nationwide to offer NOW accounts
and established the Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee
to preside over the phaseout and ultimate elimination, by 1986, of
regulatory interest rate ceilings on time and savings deposits. The
Garn–St Germain Act of 1982 permitted depository institutions to
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on branching patterns has diminished.
Deregulation of Intrastate Bank Branching
Before 1975, intrastate restrictions on branching by
commercial banks were commonplace. Commercial
banks were allowed to branch statewide with few or
norestrictionsinonlyseventeenstates(seebox‘‘Cate-
gorization of States by Changes in Intrastate Branch-
ing Laws’’).11 However, intrastate branching by sav-
ings institutions was not restricted to the extent it was
for commercial banks.
Since then, mainly during the 1980s, restrictions
on intrastate branching have been removed or relaxed
substantially in all states. In some states the elimina-
tion of branching restrictions occurred in stages
whereas in others restrictions were removed at one
time. In states that relaxed intrastate branching re-
strictions, many banks opened new ofﬁces in local
markets from which they had previously been
excluded.12 Thus, one would expect the lifting of
intrastate branching restrictions to have resulted in
an increase in the number of banking ofﬁces.13 How-
offer an account that is ‘‘equivalent to and competitive with money
market mutual funds’’ and made introducing money market deposit
accounts possible for banks.
A few legal restrictions on bank deposit accounts remain. For
instance, banks are still unable to pay interest on demand deposits
(regular checking accounts), and only noncommercial customers are
eligible for NOW accounts.
11. Individual state banking laws established branching rules for
state-chartered banks. The McFadden Act of 1927 subjected nation-
ally chartered banks to the branching laws of the state in which they
were located.
12. See Dean F. Amel and J. Nellie Liang, ‘‘The Relationship
between Entry into Banking Markets and Changes in Legal Restric-
tions on Entry,’’ Antitrust Bulletin, vol. 37 (Fall 1992), pp. 631–49.
13. Comparisons across states ﬁnd less extensive branch coverage
(for example, in the total number of banking ofﬁces per capita) in
states that restrict bank branching. See Douglas D. Evanoff, ‘‘Branch
Banking and Service Accessibility,’’ Journal of Money, Credit, and
Banking, vol. 20 (May 1988), pp. 191–202.
Categorization of States by Changes in Intrastate Branching Laws
To facilitate analysis of the effects of changes in intrastate
branching laws on bank ofﬁce patterns over 1975–95, states
and the District of Columbia are classiﬁed into ﬁve groups.
These classiﬁcations are based on the degree to which
intrastate branching by commercial banks was restricted
under state laws as of January 1, 1975, and on the extent to
which these laws were subsequently relaxed.
Categorization of States by Changes in Intrastate
Branching Laws
Categorization by changes in
state branching restrictions States
Full statewide branching,
1975–92
Alaska, Arizona, California,
Delaware, District of Columbia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Maryland,
Nevada, North Carolina,
Rhode Island, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia,
and Washington
Severe restrictions 1975–92 Iowa
Severe restrictions in 1975;
elimination by 1992
Florida, Indiana, Kansas,
Louisiana, New Hampshire, Texas,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin
Severe restrictions in 1975;
signiﬁcant relaxation by 1992
Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky,
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, and
Wyoming
Moderate restrictions in 1975;
elimination or signiﬁcant
relaxation by 1992
Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut,
Georgia, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
and Utah
Source. Dean F. Amel, ‘‘State Laws Affecting the Geographic Expan-
sion of Commercial Banks,’’ Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, Division of Research and Statistics, staff memorandum, September
1993.
States that had few or no restrictions on intrastate branch-
ing throughout 1975–92 are placed in the full statewide
branching category.1 States where, as of 1975, banks were
subject to a limit of ﬁve or fewer ofﬁces (in some cases,
only one) are categorized as having had severe restric-
tions. These states are further subdivided into those where
branching restrictions were completely eliminated by year-
end 1992; those where the restrictions were substantially
relaxed by year-end 1992; and those where no signiﬁcant
change occurred.2
The ﬁnal grouping consists of states where branching
laws were moderately restrictive as of 1975. Most of these
states limited branching to a single county, to contiguous
counties, or to locations within a speciﬁed distance from
the home ofﬁce. Several imposed a form of ‘‘home ofﬁce
protection law,’’ prohibiting banks from branching into a
municipality with a population below a speciﬁed threshold
and where the principal ofﬁce of another institution was
located. In all these states, branching restrictions were
either completely eliminated or signiﬁcantly eased by year-
end 1992.
1. Three of these states placed mild restrictions on bank branching as
of 1975. Hawaii imposed some restrictions on the number of ofﬁces in
Honolulu; Virginia and Washington allowed statewide branching by merger
or acquisition but restricted de novo branching to the county in which the
bank’s principal ofﬁce was located. All three states eliminated these branch-
ing restrictions by 1987.
2. Among those states in which severe branching restrictions were
signiﬁcantly relaxed (but not eliminated) by year-end 1992, only Illinois had
lifted its remaining restrictions by year-end 1995. Iowa alone retained severe
restrictions on bank branching through 1992, although it allowed small
increases in the numerical limits on bank branching during the period.
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deregulation from other signiﬁcant developments
affecting bank branching behavior is difﬁcult.
Deregulation of Interstate Banking
Until the late 1970s, no state permitted out-of-state
commercial banking organizations to operate in-state
banking subsidiaries. State barriers to interstate bank-
ing began to fall in 1978, when Maine relaxed restric-
tions on entry by out-of-state holding companies.
During the 1980s and early 1990s, every state except
Hawaii followed suit by allowing some degree of
interstate banking. Until recently, commercial bank-
ing organizations could expand ofﬁce networks
across state lines only through holding company
acquisitions (see box ‘‘The Riegle–Neal Act of
1994’’).
Historically, savings associations and their parent
organizations had been subject to similar restrictions
on interstate expansion. In 1986, however, the Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board relaxed many of the
restrictions on interstate acquisition of savings asso-
ciations, particularly when failing institutions were
involved. In 1992, the Ofﬁce of Thrift Supervision,
successor agency to the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board, granted savings associations full interstate
branching privileges.
The effects of relaxing restrictions on interstate
banking on the distribution of banking ofﬁces are
uncertain. To date, most expansion by banking orga-
nizations across state boundaries has involved acqui-
sitions or mergers rather than de novo entry, and the
effects of such transactions can vary depending on
the circumstances. For example, acquisition of an
inefﬁciently run bank by an out-of-state banking
organization, when the inefﬁciencies are related to
the size or scope of the acquired bank’s ofﬁce net-
work, could result in either the closing of inefﬁcient
ofﬁces or, with an undersized network, the opening of
new ofﬁces. In contrast, one would not expect the
acquisition of an efﬁciently run institution to lead to
changes in the number and location of the acquired
bank’s ofﬁces.
The Community Reinvestment Act
The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA)
encourages commercial banks and savings associa-
tions to help meet the credit needs of the communi-
ties in which they are chartered, consistent with safe
and sound banking practices. In evaluating compli-
ance with the CRA, regulators have always consid-
ered an institution’s record of opening and closing
ofﬁces.14 To achieve a good CRA compliance record,
an institution may open or retain ofﬁces in lower-
income communities. Moreover, a strong ofﬁce pres-
ence in lower-income communities may not only
help an institution avoid costly CRA-related pro-
tests of applications for mergers and acquisitions
but also create opportunities for new and proﬁtable
business relationships. To further enhance their rec-
ords of serving their local communities, many banks
and savings associations have entered into agree-
ments with community organizations. These agree-
ments sometimes involve pledges to retain existing
14. For additional details, see Grifﬁth L. Garwood and Dolores S.
Smith, ‘‘The Community Reinvestment Act: Evolution and Current
Issues,’’ Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 79 (April 1993), pp. 251–67.
The Riegle–Neal Act of 1994
The Douglas Amendment to the federal Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956 restricted the ownership of bank-
ing subsidiaries by bank holding companies to only the
state in which the holding companies were headquartered
unless other states expressly permitted their entry or they
were grandfathered. Passage of the Riegle–Neal Inter-
state Banking and Branching Efﬁciency Act in 1994
effectively repealed the Douglas Amendment by allow-
ing a bank holding company to acquire a bank in any
state provided that certain conditions were met, includ-
ing compliance with the Community Reinvestment Act
(CRA). However, states may still prohibit out-of-state
banks from establishing new (de novo) banks within their
borders, and most states maintain such restrictions.
Besides the historical restriction on interstate expan-
sion by bank holding companies, federal and state laws
generally prevented individual commercial banks from
branching across state lines. The Riegle–Neal Act effec-
tively eliminated these restrictions for commercial banks.
As of June 1, 1997, the act allows bank holding compa-
nies to consolidate their interstate banks into an ofﬁce
network and ‘‘independent’’ banks (those not owned by a
bank holding company) to branch interstate by merging
with another bank across state lines.1 However, the estab-
lishment of de novo ofﬁces within a state by an out-of-
state bank is allowed only where speciﬁcally authorized
by state law, and most states do not permit it.
1. Only banks satisfying certain conditions, such as not exceeding
limits on statewide deposit shares, may acquire branches across state lines
under the Riegle–Neal Act. The law allowed states to ‘‘opt out’’ of the
Riegle–Neal liberalization and to continue prohibitions against interstate
branching. Only two states, Montana and Texas, chose to do so.
Changes in the Distribution of Banking Ofﬁces 713ofﬁces or to establish new ofﬁces in lower-income
neighborhoods.15
Current CRA regulations, introduced in 1995,
establish three performance-based measures of com-
pliance, including a service test that focuses on the
availability and effectiveness of an institution’s sys-
tem for delivering retail banking services.16 The ser-
vice test is the performance measure that is most
relevant to the effect of the CRA on bank branching
activity. This test considers the geographic distribu-
tion and the range of services provided by an institu-
tion’s ofﬁces, along with its record of opening and
closing ofﬁces (see box ‘‘The Service Test’’). The
regulatory focus on ofﬁce locations reﬂects the view
that convenient access to full-service ofﬁces within a
community is an important factor determining the
availability of credit and other banking services.17
Industry Consolidation and Competition
Generally, mergers, acquisitions, and failures are
believed to reduce the number of banking ofﬁces,
although there are differing views as to the under-
lying causes. One view is that consolidation in the
banking industry has been necessary to increase efﬁ-
ciency. In this view, changes in demographics, tech-
nology, regulation, and other factors had resulted
in overcapacity, necessitating structural and distribu-
tional changes within the industry. At the same time,
concerns have been expressed that consolidation may
have reduced competition and led to an excessive
decline in the provision of banking services, includ-
ing unwarranted reductions in the number of banking
ofﬁces.
Mergers and acquisitions have been transforming
the structure of the banking industry.18 In many cases,
these mergers have involved direct competitors in
the same local banking markets. Mergers and acqui-
sitions often result in changes in the number and
geographic distribution of the combined institution’s
ofﬁces. When institutions serving the same geo-
graphic market merge, a reorganization of the com-
bined ofﬁce networks typically occurs, with formerly
competing ofﬁces being combined and customer
accounts transferred to the surviving ofﬁces. In addi-
tion, mergers may provide a convenient opportu-
nity for management to reassess the effectiveness
of the entire ofﬁce network, and such an evaluation
may lead to changes in the network’s geographic
conﬁguration.
The large number of failures of commercial banks
and savings associations also contributed to industry
consolidation over the past two decades. Between
1984 and 1994, nearly 1,300 commercial banks and
more than 1,100 savings associations failed—levels
of failure not seen since the Great Depression. Many
of these failed banks and savings institutions were
acquired by healthy organizations or were reopened
by investors entering the banking business. In some
cases, ofﬁces of failed banks and savings institutions
15. Alex Schwartz, Banks and Community Development: The
Implementation of Community Reinvestment Act Agreements
(New York: Community Development Research Center, New School
of Social Research, June 1997).
16. See Federal Reserve press release, ‘‘Community Reinvestment
Act Regulations,’’ April 24, 1995.
17. Additional consumer protection regulation pertaining to branch
closings comes from section 228 of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991. This law requires banking
institutions to notify bank customers and the appropriate regulatory
agency in advance of branch closings and to adopt a policy statement
regarding branch closings. As part of each CRA examination, regula-
tors consider the institution’s compliance with this law.
18. For details, see Stephen A. Rhoades, ‘‘Bank Mergers and
Industrywide Structure, 1980–94,’’ Staff Study 169 (Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System, 1996).
The Service Test
When evaluating performance of a banking institution
under the service test, regulators consider the following
factors:
1. The current distribution of the institution’s branch
ofﬁces among low-, moderate-, middle-, and upper-
income areas of its community
2. The record of opening and closing branches, par-
ticularly those located in low- or moderate-income areas
or serving low- or moderate-income individuals
3. The availability and effectiveness of alternative sys-
tems for delivering retail banking services (for example,
ATMs)
4. The range of services provided across the institu-
tion’s community and the degree that these services are
tailored to the speciﬁc needs of the different segments of
the community.
The CRA regulations emphasize that alternative sys-
tems for delivering retail banking services, such as
ATMs, will be considered only to the extent that they are
effective alternatives for providing services to low- and
moderate-income areas and individuals. The regulations
do not require an institution to expand its branch network
or to operate unproﬁtable branches nor do they require
that an institution’s branches and other service delivery
systems be accessible to every part of its local commu-
nity. At the same time, however, they indicate that the
institution’s delivery system should not exhibit conspicu-
ous gaps in accessibility unless such gaps can be reason-
ably justiﬁed.
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organization. Overall, we expect failures to lead to a
reduction in the number of banking ofﬁces.
Even though many commercial banks and savings
associations failed during this period, a large number
of new institutions were established. Between 1984
and 1994, nearly 2,100 new commercial banks were
chartered, resulting in at least that number of new
banking ofﬁces.19
Commercial banks and savings associations have
also faced increased competitive pressures from both
nonbanking ﬁnancial institutions and from banking
institutions that previously faced legal barriers to
entering local banking markets. The implications of
increased competition for branching are uncertain.
On the one hand, increased competitive pressures
may force banking organizations to cut costs by
streamlining their branch structures. On the other
hand, the convenience and services offered by an
extensive ofﬁce network may help solidify customer
relationships and differentiate a bank from its com-
petitors, particularly from nonbanking institutions;
thus banking organizations may have an incentive to
maintain or even expand ofﬁce networks.
CHANGES IN THE DISTRIBUTION
OF BANKING OFFICES
Using the new database, we examine the relationship
between the broad trends in bank ofﬁce patterns
between 1975 and 1995 and changes in the economic
and regulatory environments. In evaluating these rela-
tionships, we recognize that changes in the economic
and regulatory environment evolved simultaneously
and that their direct effects on branching decisions
may have been complementary or conﬂicting. In this
analysis, with the exception of population growth, we
do not explicitly control for the interactions among
these factors. When appropriate, we separate out the
effects of population growth by focusing on trends in
the number of banking ofﬁces per capita.20
Finally, for some of the discussion that follows,
banking ofﬁces are grouped according to features of
the economic or regulatory environment, and then
changes in the shares of banking ofﬁces across these
groupings are reported. Despite observations that the
share of total banking ofﬁces has declined for some
categories between 1975 and 1995, the absolute num-
ber of banking ofﬁces has generally increased in all
categories.
Population Changes and Bank Ofﬁce Patterns
The growth of and movements in population may
help explain some of the broad patterns that we have
identiﬁed, because population growth and growth in
the number of banking ofﬁces are positively related.
Overall, those areas with low population growth rates
between 1975 and 1995 saw their share of all banking
ofﬁces decline about 4 percentage points (table 3). In
comparison, areas with high population growth saw
their share of all banking ofﬁces increase about 4 per-
centage points.
Grouping ofﬁces by location—central city or sub-
urban parts of metropolitan areas or rural parts of
states—also reveals a strong relation between popula-
tion growth and the number of ofﬁces. Between 1975
and 1995, both population share and the share of all
banking ofﬁces increased in suburban areas about
3 percentage points. In contrast, central city and rural
areas experienced a decline both in their share of
population and in their share of all banking ofﬁces.
Thus, the data suggest that population shifts into
suburban areas were a strong catalyst for ofﬁce
expansion.
Looking within central city, suburban, and rural
areas, there is a consistent relationship between rates
of population growth and changes in ofﬁce shares.
Areas with high population growth experienced the
largest growth in ofﬁces. Population growth, how-
ever, does not appear to fully explain patterns of
ofﬁce growth. For example, high-growth suburban
areas experienced a substantially larger increase in
ofﬁce share than either central city or rural high-
growth areas.
In terms of the divergent trends discussed earlier,
the general pattern of high growth in the number of
ofﬁces from 1975 to 1985 followed by a contraction
from 1985 to 1995 appears in every geographic cate-
gory (not shown in table). Even in suburban areas,
whose overall share of banking ofﬁces increased, the
number of ofﬁces declined between 1985 and 1995.
Effects of Easing Intrastate Branching
Restrictions
To examine the effect of changes in intrastate branch-
ing restrictions on changes in the number of banking
19. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Statistics on Bank-
ing: A Statistical History of the United States Banking Industry,
Historical 1934–1994 (Washington: FDIC, 1995).
20. The population-adjusted results presented here show the num-
ber of banking ofﬁces per 10,000 persons. In the exposition, some
population-adjusted results are alternately characterized as ‘‘ofﬁces
per capita.’’
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branching was initially restricted and subsequently
liberalized between 1975 and 1992. Year-end 1992
was selected as the end date for categorizing changes
in the laws that might have inﬂuenced changes in
ofﬁce patterns through 1995 because banks’ response
to changes in branching restrictions takes some time.
(See the box ‘‘Categorization of States by Changes in
Intrastate Branching Laws.’’)
As expected, the lifting of intrastate branching
restrictions appears to be related to an increase in the
number of banking ofﬁces. States beginning the
period with severe restrictions that were subsequently
eased or eliminated increased their share of all U.S.
banking ofﬁces between 1975 and 1995 (table 4).
Most notably, states that went from having severe
restrictions to full statewide branching by 1992
increased their share of all banking ofﬁces from
16.1 percent in 1975 to 19.8 percent in 1995—a
59 percent increase in the number of ofﬁces.
Separating the effect of population growth on the
number of banking ofﬁces in a state from the effect
of changes in bank branching laws involves focusing
on the population-adjusted number of ofﬁces. Over-
all, between 1975 and 1995, the number of banking
ofﬁces per 10,000 U.S. residents increased about
10 percent, from 3.06 to 3.38. The largest increases
occurred in states that either eliminated or substan-
tially relaxed severe branching restrictions, while the
number decreased between 1975 and 1995 in states
that already had full statewide branching as of 1975.
Thus, on the surface, deregulation appears to be
associated with an increase in the number of branches
per capita.
However, deregulation of intrastate bank branching
does not appear to provide an explanation for the
differences in trends during the two ten-year periods.
The general trend of a rapid expansion followed by a
contraction holds for all states, regardless of how
branching restrictions changed. The contraction was
most severe in states that had statewide branching
throughout and least severe in states that began with
severe restrictions and later relaxed them.
Banking Industry Consolidation
and Bank Ofﬁce Patterns
In this section we examine the relationship between
changes in industry consolidation since 1975 and
changes in the number and location of banking
ofﬁces. The analysis begins with the calculation—for
the ﬁve-year periods starting with the years 1975,
1980, 1985, and 1990—of the percentage of ofﬁces in
three categories: those acquired by another institu-
tion; those acquired by another institution with an
ofﬁce in the same ZIP code; and those belonging to
an institution that failed or that merged into a ﬁrm
that then failed. In computing the ﬁrst two measures
we excluded all ofﬁces belonging to an institution
that failed (or merged into a ﬁrm that failed) dur-
ing the ﬁve-year period. Thus these measures per-
tain only to mergers among nonfailing ﬁrms. Also
excluded are consolidations of institutions that were
already part of the same holding company.21
21. This deﬁnition of merger also excludes consolidations among
bank holding companies in which the banks were not merged.
4. Distribution of banking ofﬁces by stringency of intrastate branching laws and changes in the laws, 1975–951
Branching laws and changes, 1975–92
Banking ofﬁces
(Percent except as noted)
Banking ofﬁces per 10,000 residents
(Number)
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
No change
Full statewide branching throughout ....... 26.4 25.9 26.3 26.3 25.0 3.03 3.47 3.52 3.15 2.66
Severe restrictions throughout ............. 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.7 4.76 5.71 5.78 5.12 4.97
Change
Severe restrictions to full statewide
branching ........................... 16.1 17.3 19.5 19.4 19.8 2.41 3.01 3.41 3.17 2.86
Severe to relaxed restrictions ............. 11.1 12.0 11.6 10.8 12.0 2.51 3.26 3.35 3.05 3.08
Moderate restrictions to full statewide
branching or relaxed restrictions ...... 44.3 42.8 40.8 41.9 41.4 2.84 3.41 3.49 3.45 3.13
Total .................................... 100 100 100 100 100 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Memo:
Number of ofﬁces ........................ 58,911 74,471 81,161 80,026 76,056 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
National average ......................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.06 3.51 3.71 3.58 3.38
1. States are grouped by stringency of the intrastate geographic restrictions
they placed on branching over the 1975–92 period. See box ‘‘Categorization of
States by Changes in Intrastate Branching Laws.’’
Source. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Summary of Deposits;
Ofﬁce of Thrift Supervision, Branch Ofﬁce Survey System; and Census of
Population and Housing, 1970, 1980, and 1990.
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Over 1975–95, commercial banks and savings asso-
ciations had very different experiences with mergers,
acquisitions, and failures. The percentage of commer-
cial bank ofﬁces that were acquired by another insti-
tution increased from 2 percent in 1975–80 to 6 per-
cent in 1980–85 and then remained fairly stable over
the subsequent periods (table 5). Most of these ofﬁces
were not acquired by an institution already operating
an ofﬁce in the same ZIP code area, but the propor-
tion of ofﬁces involved in such transfers has increased
over time. The proportion of commercial bank ofﬁces
involved in failures was initially less than 1 percent,
but it increased some over 1975–85 and then
remained constant.22
Much larger percentages of savings association
ofﬁces than of commercial bank ofﬁces were
acquired by another institution, and after 1985,
extraordinarily large percentages failed. For instance,
during the ﬁve-year period beginning in 1990,
nearly 15 percent of savings association ofﬁces were
acquired by another institution (compared with 6 per-
cent for commercial bank ofﬁces), and 26 percent
were involved in a failure (compared with 3 percent
for commercial bank ofﬁces). The proportion of sav-
ings association ofﬁces involved in failures was quite
low during the late 1970s and early 1980s, as was the
case for commercial banks.
Effects of Consolidation on Bank Ofﬁce Patterns
To determine whether consolidation has been asso-
ciated with a reduction in ofﬁces, we identify those
ZIP code areas likely to have experienced
consolidation—areas with high rates of merger activ-
ity. We also examine trends in the number of ofﬁces
in areas where there were mergers between institu-
tions operating ofﬁces in the same ZIP code. We
expect that these areas are most likely to show the
effects of consolidation.
The rate of merger and acquisition activity and the
numbers of failures within ZIP code areas were cal-
culated for the two major periods: 1975–85 and
1985–95. We restricted our analysis to mergers that
did not involve failed institutions because mergers
involving failed institutions were often motivated by
special circumstances. The effects of failures were
examined separately.
The rate of merger activity is represented by the
percentage of banking ofﬁces in a ZIP code area that
were involved in mergers and acquisitions. Those
ZIP code areas in which more (or fewer) than 10 per-
cent of all banking ofﬁces were acquired by another
institution during 1975–85 or 1985–95 were classi-
ﬁed as having a ‘‘high’’ (‘‘low’’) rate of merger
activity for the period. Analogous classiﬁcations were
based on the proportion of ofﬁces acquired by another
institution with an ofﬁce in the same ZIP code area.
For failures, any area that included at least one ofﬁce
of a bank that failed in a period was classiﬁed as
‘‘high’’ for that period; areas with no failures were
classiﬁed as ‘‘low’’ for that period.
For virtually all merger and failure classiﬁcations,
the number of banking ofﬁces per 10,000 residents
increased between 1975 and 1985 and then declined,
a ﬁnding consistent with the broad trends observed
previously (table 6). However, a closer look reveals
important differences between commercial banks and
savings associations.
For commercial banks, merger, acquisition, and
failure activity appears to be generally unrelated to
branching patterns. Numbers of ofﬁces per capita are
nearly the same across merger and failure categories
in any given year. Further, in nearly every merger and
failure category, the number of ofﬁces increases con-
tinually over time, and the number of ofﬁces per
capita increases from 1975 to 1985 and then declines.
The only exception to this is that the number of
ofﬁces per capita in any year is higher in ZIP code
22. The high failure rate for the 1990–95 period is the consequence
of very high numbers of failures in the early portion of this period.
Few institutions failed between 1993 and 1995.
5. Banking ofﬁces that were merged into another
institution or were involved in a failure,
in ﬁve-year periods, 1975–94
Percent
Type of institution and disposition
of ofﬁce over next ﬁve years
Initial year
of ﬁve-year period
1975 1980 1985 1990
Commercial banks
Acquired by another institution1 .......... 2.3 6.2 5.2 5.8
Acquired by ﬁrm with ofﬁce
in same ZIP code1 ................... .2 1.2 1.5 2.0
Failed or merged into a ﬁrm that failed .... .2 .8 2.9 2.9
Savings associations
Acquired by another institution1 .......... 7.1 22.5 7.8 14.6
Acquired by ﬁrm with ofﬁce
in same ZIP code1 ................... .4 2.7 .8 3.8
Failed or merged into a ﬁrm that failed .... .0 1.8 21.5 26.0
All institutions
Acquired by another institution1 .......... 3.6 11.2 6.0 8.4
Acquired by ﬁrm with ofﬁce
in same ZIP code1 ................... .2 1.6 1.3 2.5
Failed or merged into a ﬁrm that failed .... .2 1.1 8.6 9.8
1. Excludes ofﬁces belonging to an institution that failed during the succeed-
ing ﬁve-year period and ofﬁces acquired by an institution that is part of the same
holding company.
Source. Federal Reserve Board, National Information Center database; Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation, Summary of Deposits; and Ofﬁce of Thrift
Supervision, Goings and Gainings and Branch Ofﬁce Survey System.
Changes in the Distribution of Banking Ofﬁces 717areas with high proportions of ofﬁces acquired by
another institution operating an ofﬁce in the same ZIP
code area in both periods.
For savings associations, unlike commercial banks,
the number of ofﬁces per capita appears to be related
to the level of merger and failure activity within ZIP
code areas. For example, in 1975 the number of
ofﬁces per capita in ZIP code areas with high levels
of merger activity in both 1975–85 and 1985–95 was
more than four times that in areas with low merger
activity during both decades. Moreover, particularly
after 1985, changes in both the number of ofﬁces and
the per capita number of ofﬁces appear to differ
across ZIP code areas with different rates of mergers
and failures. For example, areas with low merger
activity show no change in the number of ofﬁces per
capita from 1985 to 1995; in contrast, those with
persistently high merger activity or with persistently
high levels of failure show sharp declines from 1985
to 1995.
When commercial banks and savings associations
are combined, some relationship is apparent between
merger and failure activity and both the per capita
number of banking ofﬁces and changes in the per
6. Distribution of banking ofﬁces in ZIP code areas by rates of merger and acquisition or failure, 1975–95
Number
Rates of merger and acquisition or failure,
by type of institution, 1975–951
Banking ofﬁces Banking ofﬁces per 10,000 residents
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Commercial banks
Merger and acquisition rate 2
Low 1975–85, Low 1985–95 ........... 11,245 13,120 13,963 14,120 14,951 2.00 2.21 2.25 2.16 2.15
High 1975–85, Low 1985–95 ........... 3,397 3,893 3,994 3,884 4,013 2.23 2.49 2.52 2.38 2.37
Low 1975–85, High 1985–95 ........... 4,002 4,808 5,214 5,209 5,769 2.07 2.34 2.42 2.28 2.37
High 1975–85, High 1985–95 .......... 2,971 3,452 3,652 3,787 4,168 2.14 2.39 2.45 2.42 2.54
With institutions in same ZIP code 2
Low 1975–85, Low 1985–95 ........... 18,658 21,787 23,137 23,342 25,056 2.03 2.26 2.30 2.20 2.23
High 1975–85, Low 1985–95 ........... 702 766 754 744 773 2.40 2.64 2.63 2.61 2.69
Low 1975–85, High 1985–95 ........... 1,929 2,341 2,514 2,493 2,657 2.17 2.51 2.60 2.43 2.46
High 1975–85, High 1985–95 .......... 326 379 418 421 415 3.01 3.41 3.73 3.62 3.47
Failure rate
High 1975–85, Low 1985–95 ........... 568 652 645 605 658 2.36 2.59 2.52 2.32 2.44
Low 1975–85, High 1985–95 ........... 19,307 23,377 26,226 26,354 28,251 1.99 2.29 2.43 2.32 2.37
High 1975–85, High 1985–95 .......... 1,992 2,207 2,326 2,170 2,085 2.80 3.05 3.12 2.84 2.67
Savings associations
Merger and acquisition rate 2
Low 1975–85, Low 1985–95 ........... 1,245 2,120 2,186 2,625 2,423 .22 .36 .35 .40 .35
High 1975–85, Low 1985–95 ........... 1,111 1,376 1,299 1,367 1,219 .73 .88 .82 .84 .72
Low 1975–85, High 1985–95 ........... 1,074 1,697 1,893 1,907 1,438 .55 .83 .88 .83 .59
High 1975–85, High 1985–95 .......... 1,380 1,790 1,821 1,782 1,239 .99 1.24 1.22 1.14 .75
With institutions in same ZIP code 2
Low 1975–85, Low 1985–95 ........... 3,672 5,446 5,603 6,116 5,179 .40 .56 .56 .58 .46
High 1975–85, Low 1985–95 ........... 225 280 265 274 216 .77 .96 .93 .96 .75
Low 1975–85, High 1985–95 ........... 758 1,070 1,148 1,111 801 .85 1.15 1.19 1.08 .74
High 1975–85, High 1985–95 .......... 155 187 183 180 123 1.43 1.68 1.63 1.55 1.03
Failure rate
High 1975–85, Low 1985–95 ........... 149 221 214 213 151 .62 .88 .84 .82 .56
Low 1975–85, High 1985–95 ........... 9,426 14,307 16,339 14,763 8,869 .97 1.40 1.51 1.30 .74
High 1975–85, High 1985–95 .......... 1,044 1,451 1,389 1,240 822 1.47 2.01 1.86 1.62 1.05
All
Merger and acquisition rate 2
Low 1975–85, Low 1985–95 ........... 12,490 15,240 16,149 16,745 17,374 2.22 2.57 2.60 2.56 2.50
High 1975–85, Low 1985–95 ........... 4,508 5,269 5,293 5,251 5,232 2.96 3.38 3.34 3.22 3.09
Low 1975–85, High 1985–95 ........... 5,076 6,505 7,107 7,116 7,207 2.62 3.17 3.30 3.12 2.96
High 1975–85, High 1985–95 .......... 4,351 5,242 5,473 5,569 5,407 3.14 3.63 3.67 3.56 3.29
With institutions in same ZIP code 2
Low 1975–85, Low 1985–95 ........... 22,330 27,233 28,740 29,458 30,235 2.43 2.82 2.85 2.78 2.69
High 1975–85, Low 1985–95 ........... 927 1,046 1,019 1,018 989 3.16 3.60 3.56 3.58 3.44
Low 1975–85, High 1985–95 ........... 2,687 3,411 3,662 3,604 3,458 3.02 3.66 3.78 3.51 3.20
High 1975–85, High 1985–95 .......... 481 566 601 601 538 4.44 5.09 5.36 5.17 4.50
Failure rate
High 1975–85, Low 1985–95 ........... 717 873 859 818 809 2.98 3.47 3.36 3.14 3.00
Low 1975–85, High 1985–95 ........... 28,733 37,684 42,565 41,117 37,120 2.96 3.69 3.94 3.63 3.11
High 1975–85, High 1985–95 .......... 3,036 3,658 3,715 3,410 2,907 4.26 5.06 4.98 4.46 3.72
1. ZIP codes where more (or fewer) than 10 percent of all banking ofﬁces
were acquired by another institution during the 1975–85 or 1985–95 periods
were classiﬁed as having a ‘‘high’’ (‘‘low’’) merger rate for the subperiod. A
similar classiﬁcation was made based on the proportion of ofﬁces acquired by
another institution with an ofﬁce in the same ZIP code. ZIP codes containing
one or more ofﬁces of an institution that failed during the 1975–85 or 1985–95
periods were classiﬁed as ‘‘high’’ for the subperiod. ZIP codes containing no
ofﬁces of a failed institution were classiﬁed as ‘‘low.’’
2. Excludes ZIP codes where ofﬁces of institutions that failed during the
1975–95 period were located.
Source. Federal Reserve Board, National Information Center database;
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Summary of Deposits; Ofﬁce of Thrift
Supervision, Goings and Gainings and Branch Ofﬁce Survey System; and
Census of Population and Housing, 1970, 1980, and 1990.
718 Federal Reserve Bulletin September 1997capita number over time. In particular, a higher level
of merger activity in either the 1975–85 period or
the 1985–95 period or in both or an incidence of
failure tends to be associated with a larger decline in
the number of ofﬁces per capita between 1985 and
1995. This evidence, coupled with the disproportion-
ate occurrence of mergers, acquisitions, and failures
in ZIP code areas that had higher numbers of banking
ofﬁces per capita, provides support for the hypothesis
that the reduction in banking ofﬁces was a response
to excess capacity in banking. Thus, the contraction
over 1985–95 in the number of ofﬁces per capita may
have been a response to inefﬁciencies that arose
during the earlier period, which was one of signiﬁ-
cant expansion. However, this evidence is also con-
sistent with the notion that the level of service has
been reduced as a result of reduced competition.
A deﬁnitive conclusion regarding the competitive
effects of mergers, acquisitions, and failures cannot
be reached, though, without a detailed, market-level
analysis.
Because little relationship was observed between
merger, acquisition, and failure activity and patterns
of commercial bank branching, the net effect of these
factors on savings association patterns drives the
pattern for all institutions. This ﬁnding does not
necessarily mean, however, that commercial bank
branching has been unaffected by mergers, acquisi-
tions, or failures. For instance, even though many
commercial banks failed during this period, many
others purchased savings association ofﬁces, and
these purchases may have offset what would other-
wise have been an overall decline in the number of
commercial bank ofﬁces due to failures.
CHANGES IN THE DISTRIBUTION
OF BANKING OFFICES
BY NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS
Banking regulation, particularly the CRA, encour-
ages commercial banks and savings associations to
make their products and services available through-
out all segments of their community. Concerns have
been raised that, despite the CRA, a disproportionate
number of banking ofﬁces have been closed in lower-
income neighborhoods in recent years. To date, how-
ever, no systematic analysis has examined the distri-
bution of banking ofﬁces across neighborhoods
stratiﬁed by their urbanization and income character-
istics and the way this distribution has changed over
time.
To analyze changes in the distribution of banking
ofﬁces across neighborhoods (deﬁned by ZIP code
boundaries) with differing characteristics, neighbor-
hoods are ﬁrst classiﬁed by their relative median
household income (see box, ‘‘Categorization of
Neighborhoods by Relative Household Median
Income’’). The analysis excludes areas that are
heavily commercial or that have too few residents
to permit classiﬁcation by income; these areas are
referred to here as business districts (see appen-
dix A for details).
The analysis is subject to several limitations. First,
although we use the number of ofﬁces in a ZIP code
area as a proxy for the availability of banking ser-
vices in a neighborhood, people often have con-
venient access to banking ofﬁces outside their imme-
diate neighborhoods, such as those near places of
employment. Second, although we attempted to sepa-
rate out business districts, some of the remaining ZIP
code areas may still be heavily commercial, and, as a
result, may have a relatively large number of banking
ofﬁces. Finally, this study cannot quantify the level of
services offered at a branch or how it may have
changed over time.
Changes by Neighborhood Income
In 1995, the majority of banking ofﬁces were located
in middle-income neighborhoods, with relatively few
in low-income neighborhoods. Low-income neigh-
borhoods were the only areas in which the number of
banking ofﬁces declined (by 21 percent) between
Categorization of Neighborhoods by Relative
Household Median Income
To assess the potential relationship between CRA and
bank ofﬁce patterns, it is useful to group ZIP code areas
according to their relative income levels. Doing so con-
forms to the classiﬁcation standards in the current CRA
regulation.1 ZIP codes are grouped according to the me-
dian household income in the ZIP code as a percentage of
the median household income in its metropolitan statisti-
cal area (MSA) or in the nonmetropolitan portion of the
state if the ZIP code is not located in an MSA. Categories
are shown in the table below.
1. Note, however, that the CRA regulation deﬁnes a neighborhood as a
census tract or block numbering area.
Income category Percentage of area
median
Number of ZIP codes
in category in 1995
Low ................. Less than 50 523
Moderate ............. 50–80 3,940
Middle ............... 80–120 12,386
High ................. More than 120 4,080
Changes in the Distribution of Banking Ofﬁces 7191975 and 1995. Despite a net increase in the overall
number of ofﬁces over the entire twenty-year period,
the number declined between 1985 and 1995 in all
neighborhoods except those in the high-income
category. In low- and moderate-income areas taken
together the reduction in the number of banking
ofﬁces was relatively large—nearly two-thirds of the
total decline in ofﬁces (excluding ofﬁces in business
districts) occurred in these areas, which had only
about one-ﬁfth of all banking ofﬁces in 1985.
However, to better understand the relationship
between changes in the number of banking ofﬁces
and neighborhood income, population changes must
be considered. For example, in addition to losing
ofﬁces, low-income areas also experienced signiﬁ-
cant reductions in population; as a consequence, the
number of ofﬁces per capita declined only 6.4 per-
cent. Indeed, from 1975 to 1995, the number of
banking ofﬁces per capita converged across all
income categories of neighborhoods. In 1975, low-
7. Distribution of commercial bank and savings association ofﬁces grouped by relative income of ZIP code area, 1975–95
Number
Characteristic of ZIP code area1
Banking ofﬁces Banking ofﬁces per 10,000 residents
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Commercial banks
Income (percent)
More than 120 ......................... 6,389 8,163 9,485 10,609 11,975 2.19 2.37 2.51 2.57 2.60
80to120 .............................. 23,444 27,957 30,349 30,362 32,802 2.62 2.79 2.95 2.88 2.95
50to80 ............................... 8,258 9,451 9,917 9,333 9,504 2.53 2.77 2.93 2.87 2.89
50 or less .............................. 1,587 1,699 1,687 1,473 1,404 2.82 3.07 3.18 2.92 2.90
Savings associations
Income (percent)
More than 120 ......................... 2,862 4,690 5,319 5,322 3,671 .60 .90 .94 .87 .58
80to120 .............................. 8,334 12,633 13,934 13,397 9,195 .51 .77 .82 .75 .51
50to80 ............................... 2,980 4,044 4,329 3,837 2,509 .50 .74 .80 .69 .46
50 or less .............................. 577 689 643 536 315 .80 .97 .96 .83 .49
All
Income (percent)
More than 120 ......................... 9,251 12,853 14,804 15,931 15,646 2.79 3.27 3.45 3.44 3.18
80to120 .............................. 31,778 40,590 44,283 43,759 41,997 3.13 3.56 3.76 3.63 3.46
50to80 ............................... 11,238 13,495 14,246 13,170 12,013 3.03 3.51 3.73 3.56 3.36
50 or less .............................. 2,164 2,388 2,330 2,009 1,719 3.62 4.04 4.14 3.75 3.39
Note. In this and the tables that follow, ZIP code characteristics are based on
the 1995 estimates.
1. Income is the median 1995 household income of ZIP code residents as a
percentage of median 1995 household income of metropolitan statistical area
(MSA) for ZIP codes in metropolitan areas or as a percentage of median 1995
household income of nonmetropolitan areas for ZIP codes outside MSAs.
Excludes business district ZIP codes, those with only a small number of
residents, and those for which income data are not available.
Source. Federal Reserve Board, National Information Center database;
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Summary of Deposits; Ofﬁce of Thrift
Supervision, Branch Ofﬁce Survey System; and Census of Population and
Housing, 1970, 1980, and 1990.
8. Distribution of banking ofﬁces grouped by relative income of ZIP code area and degree of urbanization, 1975–95
Number
Characteristic of ZIP code area1
Banking ofﬁces Banking ofﬁces per 10,000 residents
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Area income (percent)
More than 120
Central city ............................ 2,169 3,284 3,961 4,229 4,198 1.43 2.07 2.35 2.35 2.22
Suburban .............................. 5,323 7,350 8,362 9,253 8,967 3.02 3.55 3.70 3.80 3.42
Rural .................................. 1,759 2,219 2,481 2,449 2,481 3.43 3.70 3.87 3.71 3.52
80 to 120
Central city ............................ 9,112 12,324 13,429 13,330 12,482 1.79 2.33 2.44 2.33 2.12
Suburban .............................. 12,052 15,285 16,867 17,287 16,387 3.04 3.45 3.62 3.46 3.19
Rural .................................. 10,614 12,981 13,987 13,142 13,128 3.73 4.13 4.40 4.26 4.18
50 to 80
Central city ............................ 5,748 6,805 7,023 6,337 5,587 2.18 2.58 2.66 2.39 2.08
Suburban .............................. 3,042 3,714 4,028 3,873 3,479 2.97 3.44 3.63 3.41 3.07
Rural .................................. 2,448 2,976 3,195 2,960 2,947 3.64 4.19 4.52 4.44 4.39
50 or less
Central city ............................ 2,002 2,200 2,137 1,830 1,537 3.96 4.46 4.55 4.00 3.46
Suburban .............................. 79 91 92 88 86 2.61 2.81 2.82 2.67 2.63
Rural .................................. 83 97 101 91 96 2.89 3.13 3.30 3.30 3.42
1. See note 1 to table 7. Source. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Summary of Deposits;
Ofﬁce of Thrift Supervision, Branch Ofﬁce Survey System; and Census of
Population and Housing, 1970, 1980, and 1990.
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ofﬁces per capita; by 1995, there was relatively little
difference across income categories (table 7). A simi-
lar pattern of convergence holds for both commercial
banks and savings associations.
Changes by Neighborhood Income
and Degree of Urbanization
Bank ofﬁce patterns in relation to neighborhood
income are different across central city, suburban,
and rural areas. For example, among central city ZIP
code areas, those with the lowest incomes have the
most banking ofﬁces per capita; among suburban ZIP
code areas, those with the highest incomes have the
most banking ofﬁces per capita (table 8). Further,
from 1975 to 1995 the number of banking ofﬁces
increased in all neighborhood income categories
within suburban and rural areas. In contrast, among
central city areas, only high- and middle-income
neighborhoods experienced an increase in the num-
ber of banking ofﬁces.
The convergence across neighborhood income
categories in the number of ofﬁces per capita over
1975–95 reﬂects increases in most neighborhood
income categories, a relatively large decline in low-
income central city areas, which in 1975 had had the
highest number of ofﬁces per capita, and a more
modest decline in moderate-income central city
neighborhoods. Several explanations for the declines
are possible. For example, low- and moderate-income
areas may have been disproportionately affected by
mergers, acquisitions, and failures. A second possi-
bility is that these areas include relatively high con-
centrations of businesses and that the high levels
of branching and the subsequent sharp decline were
concentrated in these business areas.
Branching Patterns in Low- and Moderate-Income
Areas
Another potential explanation for the decline in the
number of banking ofﬁces in low- and moderate-
income areas is that these areas became poorer over
time and that as a result banks found ofﬁces in these
areas less proﬁtable. To examine this proposition,
low- and moderate-income ZIP code areas in 1995
were sorted according to their relative income in
1975, allowing us to identify those areas for which
relative income increased, decreased, or remained
constant.
The data do not show a consistent relationship
between changes in neighborhood income and
changes in the number of banking ofﬁces. Contrary
to expectations, areas with low relative incomes in
1975 that had become moderate-income areas by
1995 experienced a reduction both in the number of
ofﬁces, from 414 to 349, and in ofﬁces per capita,
from 4.34 to 4.06 (table 9). Further, although the
number of ofﬁces fell in areas that went from high-,
middle-, or moderate-income categories to the low-
income category in 1995, the number of ofﬁces per
capita increased. The strongest effect was observed
among ZIP code areas that had low incomes in both
9. Distribution of banking ofﬁces in low-income ZIP code areas, by change in relative income and owner-occupancy rate,
1975–95
Number
Characteristic of ZIP code area1
Banking ofﬁces Banking ofﬁces per 10,000 residents
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Area income in 1995 (percent)
50 to 80 percent
Change
More than 80 in 1975 .................. 5,981 7,344 7,822 7,174 6,654 3.09 3.61 3.86 3.68 3.51
50 to 80 in 1975 ....................... 4,843 5,727 5,984 5,591 5,010 2.86 3.30 3.48 3.30 3.09
50 or less in 1975 ...................... 414 424 440 405 349 4.34 4.72 4.91 4.81 4.06
50 percent or less
Change
More than 50 in 1975 .................. 990 1,129 1,094 955 869 2.65 3.00 3.08 2.94 2.84
50 or less in 1975 ...................... 1,174 1,259 1,236 1,054 850 5.28 5.80 5.95 5.14 4.34
Owner occupancy (percent)
More than 33 all areas ................. 553 622 584 503 489 2.07 2.31 2.38 2.29 2.35
33 or less all areas ..................... 1,611 1,766 1,746 1,506 1,230 5.27 5.88 6.02 5.30 4.50
More than 33 central city ............... 406 453 409 342 323 1.17 1.40 1.36 1.20 1.21
33 or less central city .................. 1,596 1,747 1,728 1,488 1,214 5.38 6.02 6.17 5.43 4.60
1. See note 1 to table 7. Source. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Summary of Deposits;
Ofﬁce of Thrift Supervision, Branch Ofﬁce Survey System; and Census of
Population and Housing, 1970, 1980, and 1990.
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tently low-income areas declined about 28 percent
and by nearly one ofﬁce per 10,000 residents.
Areas that were classiﬁed as low-income in both
1975 and 1995, however, still had the largest number
of banking ofﬁces per capita among all low-income
neighborhoods, which is consistent with the premise
that at least some of these neighborhoods contain a
relatively large number of businesses. To better iden-
tify ZIP code areas with relatively high concentra-
tions of businesses, low-income areas were sorted
according to the proportion of households in owner-
occupied units in 1995. This procedure was based on
an assumption that residential areas in close proxim-
ity to business districts are likely to have a relatively
low proportion of owner-occupied housing. ZIP code
areas were identiﬁed as having either more or less
than the median percentage of owner-occupied
housing units for all low-income ZIP code areas,
which is 33 percent.
When these areas are differentiated, two distinct
patterns emerge. As expected, low-income areas with
a low proportion of owner-occupied units had a much
larger number of banking ofﬁces per capita, and
low-income areas with a high proportion of owner-
occupied units had a low number. This ﬁnding is
consistent with the conjecture that some low-income
ZIP code areas include business districts, which have
more banking ofﬁces than more residential areas and
more banking ofﬁces per capita than middle- and
upper-income areas.
Moreover, while the number of ofﬁces per capita
has declined in low-income areas with low rates of
owner occupancy, it has increased slightly in low-
income areas with higher rates of owner occupancy.
Thus, nearly all of the general decline in the number
of banking ofﬁces in low-income areas reﬂects
declines in areas with low rates of owner occupancy.
The patterns related to owner occupancy are even
more pronounced when the analysis is restricted to
low-income areas in central cities. Within central
cities, low-income areas with a high proportion of
owner-occupied housing have a very low number of
banking ofﬁces per capita (about one ofﬁce per
10,000 residents), and that number has remained
relatively constant over the twenty-year period.23
However, in central city low-income areas with a low
proportion of owner-occupied housing, the number of
banking ofﬁces per capita is relatively large, and it
has declined in recent years.
The Effects of Mergers, Acquisitions, and Failures
on Banking Ofﬁce Patterns in Low-Income Areas
A ﬁnal conjecture we examine is whether the effects
of mergers, acquisitions, and failures differed in low-
and moderate-income areas from those in middle-
and upper-income areas. To investigate this proposi-
tion, ZIP code areas were sorted according to whether
they were low- or moderate-income and then further
segmented by merger, acquisition, and failure activity
during 1985–95, using the deﬁnitions discussed pre-
viously. The evidence from this analysis indicates
that mergers generally did not have a differential
effect on lower income areas (table 10). Among ZIP
code areas with high levels of merger activity, the
number of ofﬁces per capita and trends in the number
of ofﬁces per capita are similar across neighborhood
income classiﬁcations. However, if the mergers were
only among institutions in the same ZIP code area,
some differences are apparent. In this case, the num-
ber of ofﬁces per capita in low- and moderate-income
neighborhoods (those with income of less than
80 percent of the area median) was higher than in
other areas in 1975, but over the twenty-year period,
the numbers converged primarily because of a decline
in low- and moderate-income areas. Grouping ZIP
code areas by incidence of failure yields a similar
pattern.
CONCLUSIONS
Historically, most banking services have been deliv-
ered through banking ofﬁces. Recent changes in the
structure of the banking industry are believed to have
had an important inﬂuence on the number and loca-
tion of banking ofﬁces, with potential implications
for the availability and accessibility of banking prod-
ucts and services.
Between 1975 and 1995, the number of banking
institutions declined sharply, and the number of bank-
ing ofﬁces increased nearly 29 percent. However, this
twenty-year period embodies two different trends. In
the ﬁrst decade, the overall number of banking ofﬁces
expanded signiﬁcantly, even as the number of insti-
tutions declined slightly. In the second decade, the
number of institutions fell sharply while the number
of banking ofﬁces contracted modestly. In both
23. Surveys ﬁnd that residents of low-income areas use nonbank
providers of banking services relatively often. However, users of these
services rarely cite a lack of convenient bank ofﬁces as a reason for
using these nonbank institutions. See Arthur B. Kennickell, Martha
Starr-McCluer, and Annika E. Sunden, ‘‘Family Finances in the U.S.:
Recent Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances,’’ Federal
Reserve Bulletin, vol. 83 (January 1997), pp. 1–24; and John P.
Caskey, Lower Income Americans, Higher Cost Financial Services
(Madison, Wisconsin: Filene Research Institute, 1997).
722 Federal Reserve Bulletin September 1997decades the experiences of commercial banks and
savings associations differed markedly, particularly
from 1985 to 1995, when the number of savings
association ofﬁces plummeted while the number of
commercial bank ofﬁces increased somewhat.
These broad trends in the number and location of
banking ofﬁces have been associated with changes in
various factors, including population shifts, branch-
ing deregulation, and mergers, acquisitions, and
failures. Population growth and relaxation of legal
restrictions on branching are positively associated
with increased branching activity over the twenty
years. Areas that experienced the highest rates of
population growth increased their share of banking
ofﬁces, whereas those with the lowest growth experi-
enced a decline of similar magnitude. Also, the larg-
est increases in the number of ofﬁces per capita
occurred in states that either eliminated or substan-
tially eased legal restrictions on branching during the
period.
Mergers, acquisitions, and failures were associated
with the decline in the absolute number and per
capita number of banking ofﬁces between 1985 and
1995. Overall patterns appear to be primarily a result
of the net effect of mergers, acquisitions, and failures
of savings associations. Moreover, mergers, acquisi-
tions, and failures have taken place disproportion-
ately in ZIP code areas that had higher numbers
of banking ofﬁces per capita. On the whole, this
evidence is consistent with the view that consoli-
dation has been a response to excess capacity. Com-
petition may also play a role, but a more detailed
market-by-market analysis is required to draw ﬁrm
conclusions.
While this evidence provides plausible explana-
tions for the contractions observed in banking
between 1985 and 1995, none of it appears to explain
the steep increase in banking ofﬁces during 1975–85.
Perhaps the most signiﬁcant factor during the
1975–85 period was the effect of nonprice competi-
tion among banking institutions. Legal restrictions on
the interest rates that institutions could pay on deposit
accounts, along with the high interest rates in the late
1970s and early 1980s, provided strong incentives
for institutions to compete on the basis of conve-
nience and service rather than price, which may have
induced the establishment of many new ofﬁces.
We also examined the relationship between neigh-
borhood income and the number and changes over
time in the number of banking ofﬁces. There has been
a steady convergence over the 1975–95 period in
the number of banking ofﬁces per capita across neigh-
borhood income categories, so that as of 1995, the
numbers for all income categories were roughly
equal. The convergence reﬂects initially large num-
bers of ofﬁces per capita in low-income areas relative
to other areas, declines in the number of ofﬁces per
capita in these same areas, and increases in the num-
ber per capita in other areas.
The data indicate that there are two types of low-
income areas, particularly in central cities. One type
includes a small proportion of owner-occupied units
and a relatively large number of banking ofﬁces per
capita, which suggests that these areas may have
relatively high concentrations of businesses. The sec-
ond type of low-income area has a high proportion of
owner-occupied housing and few banking ofﬁces per
capita, although this number has remained fairly
10. Distribution of banking ofﬁces, by merger or failure rate and relative income of ZIP code area, 1975–95
Number
Merger and failure rate and
income, by ZIP code area1
Banking ofﬁces Banking ofﬁces per 10,000 residents
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
High merger rate areas 2
More than 80 percent ..................... 7,096 9,073 9,794 10,096 10,207 3.70 4.29 4.50 4.30 4.10
80 percent or less ........................ 1,891 2,187 2,240 2,078 1,945 3.67 4.21 4.46 4.25 3.97
High merger rate in ZIP 2
More than 80 percent ..................... 2,280 2,994 3,235 3,280 3,172 3.71 4.50 4.68 4.38 3.96
80 percent or less ........................ 775 857 888 798 719 4.68 4.98 5.42 4.81 3.96
High failure rate areas 2
More than 80 percent ..................... 22,081 29,772 33,875 33,417 30,615 3.59 4.42 4.82 4.48 3.95
80 percent or less ........................ 7,830 9,408 10,075 9,065 7,749 3.96 4.71 5.08 4.53 3.89
All areas
More than 80 percent ..................... 41,029 53,443 59,087 59,690 57,643 3.05 3.49 3.69 3.58 3.39
80 percent or less ........................ 13,402 15,883 16,576 15,179 13,732 3.10 3.57 3.78 3.58 3.36
1. See note 1 to table 7.
2. ZIP codes where more (or fewer) than 10 percent of all banking ofﬁces
were acquired by another institution during the 1985–95 period were classi-
ﬁed as having a ‘‘high’’ (‘‘low’’) merger rate. A similar classiﬁcation was made
based on the proportion of ofﬁces acquired by another institution with an ofﬁce
in the same ZIP code. For failure rates, ZIP codes containing one or more ofﬁces
of an institution that failed during the 1985–95 period were classiﬁed as ‘‘high;’’
ZIP codes containing no ofﬁces of a failed institution were classiﬁed as ‘‘low.’’
Source. Federal Reserve Board, National Information Center database;
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Summary of Deposits; Ofﬁce of Thrift
Supervision, Goings and Gainings and Branch Ofﬁce Survey System; and
Census of Population and Housing, 1970, 1980, and 1990.
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overall decline in the number of banking ofﬁces in
low-income areas occurred in the ﬁrst category.
On balance, there is little evidence to suggest that
mergers in general have more strongly affected the
number of banking ofﬁces in low- and moderate-
income areas than in other areas. However, mergers
involving institutions operating ofﬁces in the same
ZIP code area have been associated with a relatively
larger decline in the number of ofﬁces per 10,000
residents in low- and moderate-income areas, though
these areas also had higher levels of banking ofﬁces
than other areas at the beginning of the twenty-year
sample period.
Finally, the broad distributional patterns of bank
ofﬁces found in this analysis do not necessarily
describe the circumstances in any given neigh-
borhood or local market. Moreover, the effects of
changes in ofﬁce locations must be interpreted in
light of local conditions. Indeed, the regulatory agen-
cies that enforce the nation’s antitrust laws and the
CRA consider much more information at a far greater
level of detail than is presented in this article.
APPENDIX:C ONSTRUCTION OF THE DATABASE
The basic data on ofﬁce location were compiled as
follows. Addresses of bank ofﬁces were extracted
from the annual Summary of Deposits ﬁlings
required of all U.S. commercial banks and Branch
Ofﬁce Survey System ﬁlings required of all savings
associations for the years 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990,
and 1995. These addresses were reported as of
June 30 for each year except for savings and loan
associations that reported as of September 30 in 1975
and 1980. The ofﬁce list includes all locations quali-
fying as separate institution ofﬁces under federal
guidelines but excludes some ‘‘drive-ins’’ and most
standalone ATMs.24 Reporting institutions include all
federally insured commercial banks, savings and loan
associations, cooperative banks, and mutual savings
banks, as deﬁned by the Federal Reserve Board’s
National Information Center database. The ofﬁce
totals reported in this article will differ slightly from
those reported elsewhere because of different agency
deﬁnitions of federally insured institutions and
because of some limited data cleaning required for
the analysis. Some ofﬁces were removed that were
double-reported to different agencies, and some
ofﬁces were added for a few institutions that did not
submit a Summary of Deposits or Branch Ofﬁce
Survey System ﬁling.
24. Supermarket ofﬁces are included under this deﬁnition if they
are staffed by bank personnel. While proliferating recently, these types
of ofﬁces were relatively rare before 1995.
A.1. Number and characteristics of ZIP code areas by relative income of ZIP code and degree of urbanization, 1995
.
Characteristic of ZIP code area1 Number of
ZIP code areas
Average
population
Average number
of ofﬁces
Distribution of ofﬁces in ZIP code areas
No ofﬁces One to three
ofﬁces
More than
three ofﬁces
Area income (percent) 2
More than 120
Central city ............................ 928 17,256 4.52 34.9 22.6 42.5
Suburban .............................. 1,818 15,993 4.93 7.1 43.7 49.2
Rural .................................. 1,334 5,581 1.86 29.1 57.0 13.9
80 to 120
Central city ............................ 2,292 22,539 5.45 28.7 18.7 52.6
Suburban .............................. 4,296 13,633 3.81 11.1 52.0 36.9
Rural .................................. 5,798 5,955 2.26 21.9 59.0 19.1
50 to 80
Central city ............................ 1,157 25,750 4.83 19.4 31.1 49.5
Suburban .............................. 1,068 13,058 3.26 15.7 52.0 32.3
Rural .................................. 1,715 4,317 1.72 24.0 63.9 12.1
50 or less
Central city ............................ 365 21,191 4.21 18.9 41.6 39.5
Suburban .............................. 37 11,054 2.32 18.9 64.9 16.2
Rural .................................. 121 3,384 .79 44.6 52.9 2.5
Business district
Central city ............................ 296 . . . 5.88 24.3 33.8 41.9
Suburban .............................. 682 . . . 1.10 17.9 79.0 3.1
Rural .................................. 2,310 . . . .95 13.6 86.1 .3
Total .................................... 24,217 12,278 3.14 19.4 52.5 28.1
1. ZIP code characteristics are based on the 1995 estimates.
2. Income is median 1995 household income of ZIP code residents as a
percentage of median 1995 household income of metropolitan statistical area
(MSA) for ZIP codes in metropolitan areas or as a percentage of median 1995
household income of nonmetropolitan areas for ZIP codes outside MSAs. Busi-
ness district ZIP codes include those with a small number of residents, those in
central business districts, or those for which income data are not available.
Source. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Summary of Deposits;
Ofﬁce of Thrift Supervision, Branch Ofﬁce Survey System; and Census of
Population and Housing, 1970, 1980, and 1990.
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using the 1993 U.S. Postal Service ﬁve-digit ZIP code
corresponding to their address. In some cases where
ZIP code boundaries changed, the 1993 ZIP code
differed from the original one reported by the institu-
tion. In other instances institutions reported discontin-
ued, mailbox, or erroneous ZIP codes, which were
corrected. The decision to use 1993 ZIP codes was
made in order to deﬁne a geographic taxonomy that
was ﬁxed over the entire sample period.
Data were aggregated to the ZIP code level for
several reasons. First, it is comparatively easy to
classify addresses by ZIP code with a high degree of
accuracy. Second, ZIP code areas are large enough
(an average of 20,000 residents apiece in urban areas)
to encompass both residential areas and the business
areas that serve them, which is not the case for
census tracts, for example. Although census tracts are
designed to be economically and demographically
homogenous, they are relatively small (between
4,000 and 5,000 people) in large metropolitan areas.
Many census tracts contain no bank ofﬁces yet are
near business districts that provide ready and easy
access to banking services. One disadvantage of
using ZIP codes is that they were set up for the
convenience of the Postal Service and their ground
transportation system, not for statistical analysis. ZIP
code boundaries do not necessarily correspond to
natural socioeconomic divisions and in many cases
cut across city or county lines.
Economic and demographic variables for ZIP
codes used in the analysis are based on projections
from the Decennial Census for 1980 and 1990. CACI
Inc. provided data for both censuses using 1993 ZIP
code deﬁnitions, which are consistent with the bank
ofﬁce data. Additional information was obtained from
the Bureau of the Census for 1970. This information,
combined with annual Bureau of the Census county-
level income and population estimates, was used to
estimate economic and demographic information for
the ZIP codes for the non-census years (1975, 1985,
and 1995) used in the study.
Economic and demographic data were either not
available or deemed inappropriate for some nonresi-
dential ZIP codes. These included central business
districts in urban areas and some very small rural
areas. These ZIP codes were included in some of the
analysis, but were excluded from the analysis related
to economic and demographic characteristics. See
table A.1 for a brief description of the data sample,
including the breakdown of ZIP codes by location
and median household income. Average population
and the distribution of banking ofﬁces is reported for
each category.
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